Parental Alienation Syndrome: Analysis in India

- Saurabh Gupta*

Introduction

Parental Alienation Syndrome (‘PAS’) is the term used for referring to an unjustified disdain of a child towards a parent. It is used as an argument in child custody battles, to say that the child is biased against one parent due to this syndrome. Initially, it was developed as an explanation for false sexual abuse allegations that a child may levy against a parent. However today, especially in India, it is being used in simple custody battles where the child does not want to live with a parent. Through this paper, the author argues that PAS is an unfounded theory, with no empirical evidence in support of it. Consequently, the paper condemns the use of PAS by the Indian judiciary.

This paper first tries to understand what the syndrome actually is, as theorised by Richard A. Gardner in 1985. The author then tries to analyse whether PAS is an empirical truth or not. In doing so, the various assumptions that Gardner based this syndrome on are identified. These assumptions are then tested against reality. Further, the paper investigates the use of PAS in courts, in relation to the evidentiary value that it has. This is done with specific reference to two countries – USA and India (the former since the theory was first developed there).

Furthermore, the paper probes into the use of PAS by the Indian courts. This is done by looking at the Indian judgements where PAS has been used. The objective served here is for the author to appraise the use of PAS by the Indian courts. Further, the paper argues that PAS should have no evidentiary value in the courts of law, and that the use of such a theory by the courts is detrimental to the justice delivery system in India.

I. What is Parental Alienation Syndrome?

PAS is a term coined by Richard A. Gardner, first surfacing in the year 1985.[1] Usually arising out of divorce,[2] the syndrome is an important consideration for custody conflicts. The syndrome has been described as a psychological disturbance in which children are obsessed with unjustified denigration of a parent. This denigration may take the form of deprecation and criticism, often exaggerated.[3] While Gardner does not ascribe the syndrome to a specific age group of children, it is reasonable to assume that the PAS is more common in younger children, due to greater chances of impressionability. According to Gardner, such alienation is very different from mere ‘brainwashing’, the latter being described as a conscious and systematic programming of the child by one parent to denigrate the other.[4] In other words, brainwashing can be seen as something more deliberate. The syndrome, on the other hand, takes into its fold subconscious and non-conscious factors, over and above the conscious ones.[5] For instance, a situation where one of the parents is angry at the other parent, and the child notices this while inculcating such emotion as something acceptable, is an example of a sub-conscious factor that influences the child to develop similar feelings for the other parent. It is important to note that while the angry parent may not intend to influence the child here, the child might still get influenced. Moreover, the syndrome also encompasses certain feelings that develop inside the child, independent of the parent’s influence.[6] He made sure to distinguish between parental alienations and PAS. In parental alienation, there exists a valid reason for the child to be alienated from the hated parent, whereas in PAS, the hatred is exaggerated and unjustified since the child does not have reasons for such hatred itself, but only replicates emotions shown by the loved parent.[7]

Through his paper, Gardner also mentioned how despite the express hatred towards a parent, there may still exist certain feelings of love and affection towards the same parent, though suppressed. Similarly, for the loved parent, the child may have certain feelings of disdain, that are unexpressed.[8] He said that a child suffering from the syndrome, while talking to/about the hated parent, might make use of such vocabulary as is used by the loved parent towards the hated parent.[9] The hatred might even extend to the hated parent’s relatives, especially those that are despised by the loved parent.[10] Moreover, children suffering from the syndrome might justify this alienation by memories of minor altercations with the hated parent.[11] Such altercations cannot normally be regarded as valid reasons for the kind of hatred that the child feels. Essentially, Gardner wants to convey that a child faced with PAS is greatly influenced by the loved parent in its behaviour and attitude towards the hated parent.

Gardner also stated that the expression of hatred by a child suffering from PAS may be most extreme in the presence of both the parents.[12] This expression may mellow down in the absence of the loved parent, even transforming into an expression of affection. However, children suffering from PAS are prone to sudden outbursts of disdain in such situations.[13] The suppressed feelings of affection might provoke the children to enter into a confidentiality arrangement with the hated parent, where the child aims to ensure that his/her expression of affection should not come to the knowledge of the loved parent.[14]Another symptom as characterised by Gardner was that these children do not explicitly show any ambivalence towards the hated parent. There is no confused expression of their relationship with the hated parent, with the sole expression being one of disdain and hatred.[15] This however, does not mean that the child cannot have suppressed affection towards the hated parent. It is important to note that these symptoms as characterised by Gardner, are mere hypotheses. Gardner even says that all the symptoms may not exist in a child suffering from PAS, and there can be varying levels of syndrome from case to case.[16]

In child custody battles, children suffering from this syndrome choose the loved parent, despite not knowing what the company of the other parent is like. They even dislike the idea of visitation by the alienated parent.[17]Therefore, this syndrome might be an important factor to be considered in child custody battles, especially since child’s express wishes often play a role in the custody battles.[18]However, it is important to establish the validity of this syndrome before any consideration is made legally, something which the courts have often not done.

II. Is PAS a Reality?

In his article ‘Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody Litigation’, Gardner introduced the concept of PAS for the first time.[19] Gardner was prompted to theorise this syndrome due to the high instance of sexual abuse allegations during divorce. He theorised PAS with an objective of reasoning the high instance of child sexual abuse allegations. He was of the opinion that these allegations are mostly levelled by mothers against the fathers.[20]According to him, such allegations were false in a lot of instances, and were a product of the child suffering from PAS.[21] Gardner suggested that the accusation that started as a fabrication, may be believed as the truth by the accuser himself/herself. Thus, the accuser turns delusional.[22] However, Gardner’s views are criticised for he does not account for honest mistakes or misinterpretations of information.[23] For him, every instance of a false sexual abuse accusation is fabrication. He also fails to consider that there might be some exaggeration, where some things might be true and some not.[24]

Gardner also elucidated upon the factors that led to PAS. Apart from the parent’s influence, litigation in child custody battles itself lead to psychological disturbances and is a major cause of PAS.[25] However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into the causes of PAS. Gardner makes a lot of assumptions while theorizing this syndrome. First, he is of the opinion that even though 95% or more of all child sexual abuse allegations are true, those made in cases of divorce and child custody battles are false.[26] No substantial reasons are provided for such belief. Second, Gardner considers children to be “polymorphous perverse”.[27]He believes that “the normal child exhibits and experiences a wide variety of sexual fantasies and behaviours”.[28] He explains false accusations as being an outcome of the advanced sexual knowledge and sexualised behaviour in some children. Gardner considers such knowledge and behaviour, which is considered by professionals to be a possible marker of sexual abuse, to be normally present in non-abused children.[29]

Third, Gardner says that all adults are afflicted with some sort of paedophilia. For some, their imagination and fantasies enable them to fabricate sexual abuse allegations more easily.[30] He believes that these adults are the ones that make child sexual abuse accusations against day care, which are mostly false. At the same time, he accedes to the fact that similar accusations for places where children live together with adults (orphanages, boarding schools, etc.) are true.[31] This surfaces an inherent contradiction in his ideas, rendering his assumptions capricious and unreliable. All his assumptions are unsubstantiated, with no proper basis in support of PAS.[32]

Furthermore, Gardner does not provide any basis for the assertions that he makes about the characteristics of PAS.[33] The percentages that he proposes as a proof to his theory, find no statistical or empirical basis.[34]According to Gardner, 90% of the custody disputes involve PAS, however, there is no study that suggests this figure to be true.[35] On the contrary, in a study carried out in the United States, out of a total 9,000 custody disputes analysed, only 169 (1.9%) involved allegations of sexual abuse.[36] Therefore, it is clear that sexual abuse allegations are not as widespread as claimed by Gardner. Further, he maintains that the instance of sexual abuse allegations in PAS is really high.[37]Even if this is assumed to be true, along with an assumption that all the 169 cases involved PAS, the overall instance of PAS in custody disputes seems to be quite low. This severely undermines Gardner’s assumption of the widespread prevalence of PAS. Furthermore, Gardner’s assertion that sexual abuse allegations in contested divorce are false in most of the cases, is also undermined when analysed empirically.[38]

Gardner’s proposition that false allegations are a result of the polymorphous perversity of children is also disproved, when tested empirically. He is of the belief that an enhanced sexual knowledge or sexual behaviour is not a result of sexual experience.[39] Such behaviour is self-generated according to him. However, there is no research finding which corroborates this belief. Studies show that over-sexualized behaviour and sexual knowledge is a consequence of sexual abuse most of the time.[40] Moreover, Gardner’s assumption that adults receive sexual gratification by making false allegations is also baseless, and there is no evidence which suggests such a supposition.[41]His gendered distinction where he says that mothers are more likely to fabricate false allegations too, is not based on statistics or facts.[42] Therefore, it must be admitted that the assumptions and characteristics of PAS do not find any empirical basis, which undermines the legitimacy of the syndrome as a whole.

III. Evidentiary Value of PAS

Critics of PAS have held the view that recognition to the syndrome delegitimizes legitimate sources of parental alienation, such as neglect, abandonment during divorce, emotional abuse etc.[43] Providing recognition to PAS could open floodgates for misusing this syndrome in cases where abuse actually exists. Supporters of PAS say that where there is abuse, there can be no PAS.[44] However, the fact that in any allegation of abuse, the accused may take the defence of PAS is a problem that needs to be addressed. Since there is no clear evidence as to the existence of PAS, it is highly problematic for the courts to be entertaining this as a defence. The courts in such cases, might try to decide a case on the basis of something that might not even be a reality. This can leave children in custody disputes highly vulnerable, especially when the abuse allegations are true. Below, the author will give an overview of the standards for admitting scientific evidence in the US and India. The author has chosen US, as the idea of PAS was first propounded there. With respect to India, the author seeks to understand the standards for admitting scientific evidence, which in turn, would help understand how and why PAS is used in Indian courts.

United States

In the United States, there are two standards used for deciding the admissibility of expert witnesses’ testimony in federal courts,[45] - Frye standard and Daubert standard. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,[46] the Daubert standard overruled the Frye standard. Although the Daubert standard is now the law in federal court, the Frye standard is still in use in some jurisdictions including California, Illinois, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Washington.[47]

According to the Frye standard, ‘general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs’ is the standard that scientific evidence must hold in order to be admissible.[48] The Daubert standard, on the other hand, negates ‘general acceptance’ as a criterion. According to this standard, four factors need to be considered to test the reliability of scientific evidence - (1) whether the theory or technique can be (and has been) tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) whether the known or potential rate of error is acceptable; and (4) whether the theory or technique has gained widespread acceptance.[49]

PAS fails to hold good for either of these standards. PAS is definitely not generally accepted, and there is a lot of controversy amongst mental health professionals over the issue of parental alienation.[50] So, it fails to qualify the Frye standard. Moreover, PAS is yet to be properly tested using empirical analysis.[51] Further, the error rate hasn’t been derived yet, but is expected to be unacceptably high.[52] Another problem is that Gardner published his papers on PAS using his own publishing house.[53] There is a lot of criticism in this regard, as his papers haven’t been subjected to peer review. Today however, there is considerable literature on the PAS, some papers even confirming the existence of the syndrome. However, these papers have accepted Gardner’s assumptions in his original papers to be true, which renders their endorsement redundant. So, PAS cannot be said to qualify this condition. Lastly, since the general acceptance criterion is not fulfilled, PAS fails to qualify the Daubert standard on all four counts. Therefore, PAS should not be admissible in the courts of law. In fact, the current jurisprudence on PAS disallows for its admissibility in the US courts.[54]

India

India lacks standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence. Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deals with expert opinions. However, it lays down no criteria for admissibility of the expert testimony. In Malay Kumar Ganguly v Sukumar Mukherjee,[55] it was held by the Supreme Court that the expert testimony is of an advisory character. The expert witness is expected to put forth all the relevant facts that led him to a particular conclusion. The expert must elucidate upon the technical aspects of the question under consideration. It depends on the court to come to a particular conclusion subsequently. In most of the cases however, such evidence is admissible if it is considered to be relevant, even though it may lack any substantiation.[56] This is highly problematic, since it is solely on the discretion of the court to accept an opinion or not, with no guidelines for uniformity in this regard. Consequently, PAS has found reference in certain Indian judgements. This is pointer to the fact that a baseless syndrome like the PAS can find legitimacy through judicial pronouncements in India. Consequently, this can hamper the dispensation of justice.

IV. Use of PAS by the Indian Courts

Courts in India have given a somewhat different meaning to the Parental Alienation Syndrome. The cases that have referred to the syndrome, have not been related to sexual abuse allegations. Moreover, the courts haven’t even considered the symptoms as laid down by Gardner, and have used the term rather loosely. PAS has found mention mostly in cases related to custody disputes where the child has shown disdain towards one parent. In India, PAS was mentioned for the first time in a Supreme Court judgement -Sheila B. Das v P.R. Sugasree.[57] In this case, the daughter expressed her wish to reside with the father, after a short stint of living with him.[58] The mother alleged that the father was trying to poison their daughter, and that this was PAS.[59] The mother felt so since the daughter had chosen the father over her, despite living with her for eight years.[60] The court ruled in favour of the father.[61] Here, while recognising PAS, the court did not go into discussing it and decided merely on the basis of the “best interests of the child” doctrine. According to the “best interests” doctrine, the court decides on the basis of what is best for the child in the circumstances.[62]

After the Sheila B Das case, another significant case where PAS was considered was the case of J. Selvan v N. Punidha.[63] Here, PAS was discussed in conjunction with the doctrine of “best interests of the child”. In this case, there was a custody battle where the mother did not want the father to have any access to their children, while the father was fine with visitation rights to the mother in case the custody was given to him.[64] The court relied on two factors to decide the custody. One, it used the “best interests of the child” doctrine to hold that the father was in a better position financially and emotionally to take care of the children.[65] Moreover, the court took under consideration the fact that if one of the parents is denied access to the children totally, it may lead to PAS.[66] Such symptoms could already be seen according to the court, as the children seemed to be a ‘little withdrawn’.[67] Custody to the mother, in this case, would have resulted in such a scenario. Therefore, the custody was given to the father. It is clear from this case however, that the court has misinterpreted the meaning of PAS. It has misunderstood potential alienation and has termed it as PAS. Although this decision uses a completely different understanding of PAS, it imparts legitimacy to PAS as a concept on a prima facie basis. This legitimacy is harmful since there is a possibility that in future decisions, Courts will misinterpret this decision to mean that PAS (in its original form) is applicable in Indian law.

In a recent judgement - Vivek Singh v Romani Singh,[68] the father retained custody of the daughter from the age of 21 months to 8 years, despite this being in violation of the court order. Consequently, when the court enquired for the child’s wish with regard to the custody, the child preferred to stay with her father. The court considered a lot of factors to reach a judgement in this regard. First, it was opined by the court that the child’s interests would be served the best in her mother’s custody. The fact that the mother was a teacher in a prestigious school, and that she could take better care of the child’s education was considered here.[69]Second, it was held by the court that the child was at an age where it was necessary for her to be in the company of both her parents for proper development. Since the father had custody for all these years, it was necessary for the mother to be given custody.[70] This would also help for the child to understand mother’s love. Third, the court held that the company of a mother is more important for a female child.[71]Fourth, the court also considered the fact that denying the mother custody would be unfair, since she was the one who had the rightful custody of the child.[72] The father violated the court order, and usurped the child’s custody for a long time. On these counts, the court held that the child’s welfare lay in the company of the mother.

The important question here is the court’s disregard for the child’s own wish. The court has indeed relied on “the best interests of the child” doctrine. However, it has also considered PAS.[73] PAS can be said to have played a part in the court’s decision to disregard the child’s wish. Since the welfare of the child principle and PAS coincided in this case, it is difficult to determine the quantum of importance that the judges gave to the syndrome. However, it is still problematic that a reference was made to a disproved and unreliable theory like PAS.

An analysis of the abovementioned cases shows that there are certain fundamental problems with use of PAS by the Indian courts. First, the courts haven’t understood the syndrome in its totality. They have referred to mere alienation as PAS at times. Further, one parent poisoning a child against the other parent has also been called as PAS in certain cases. Thus, the courts have inadvertently increased the ambit of the syndrome. This has given a lot of legitimacy to the syndrome, though it has been misconstrued to refer to something else. Consequently, it opens floodgates to the future use of a syndrome which has no empirical evidence to suggest that it is a reality. This can be highly detrimental to the justice delivery system is India. It was laid down in Gaurav Nagpal v Sumedha Nagpal that child custody should be decided on the basis of welfare of the child, and not the parents’ rights or what they say.[74] Till now, the cases that have used PAS in any form have used it in conjunction with the “best interests of the child” doctrine. However, an increasing recognition to this syndrome could result in a deviation from this trend in the future. To prevent this and to protect the sanctity of the “welfare of the child” principle, the courts need to abstain from using technical terms so loosely.

Second, increasing use of PAS can blindfold the judges towards cases where the children have a genuine reason for dislike towards a parent. In India, domestic violence is quite prevalent even today. It is possible that a child feels threatened by a parent due to such violence, which is why she/he feels alienated. Such violence could be emotional as well, which is very probable to have alienated the child from that parent. But with the loose use of the term PAS, even a legitimate sense of alienation or arising from domestic violence would be misconstrued as PAS, which in turn, would be problematic for the child. Third, use of such terms legitimises the use of baseless theories by the courts. This is especially a problem for India, since we do not have any standards for admissibility of scientific evidence, unlike the USA. Such misuse of medical and psychological concepts (unfounded concepts in case of PAS) can prolong trials, which is synonymous to denial of justice at the appropriate time. All of this is a threat to the best interests of the children who are at the centre of a custody battle.

Conclusion

Parental Alienation Syndrome has the potential to become an important debate in India today, especially due to the recognition given to it by the apex court recently. This paper has argued how the syndrome is a myth. The assumptions on which it is based are unfounded. Richard Gardner failed to provide any substantiation for the assertions he made while theorising PAS, which undermine its authority. Moreover, empirical analysis at times has suggested conclusions that are in fact contradictory to those suggested by Gardener. Thus, it can be safely said that PAS is not a reality.

Further, use of the syndrome as an argument in custody battles is another area that the paper dwells upon. The argument made in this regard is that PAS should not be admissible as scientific evidence. In India, however, due to there being no standards for admissibility of scientific evidence under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, there is an increased chance of use of such unfounded theories in the courts. It is therefore argued that something like the Frye standard or the Daubert standard, as used in the USA, should be adopted by India as well.

Additionally, there is a need for the courts to understand that use of PAS is in conflict with the idea of justice. The paper has pointed out the problems that may arise due to the recognition given to PAS by the courts. These include a potential disregard for “the best interests of the child” doctrine, ignorance towards actual cases of abuse, unnecessary complication and prolonging of trials, etc. A loose usage of concepts like the PAS can lead to a slippery slope, where such concepts, when properly understood, can be misused in the future. In light of this, the paper argues that the use of PAS by the Indian courts is averse to the interests of the child in a custody battle.

*Saurabh Gupta is a 2nd year student at the National Law School of India University, Bangalore.

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[1]Richard A. Gardner, ‘Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody Litigation’ (1985) 29 Academy Forum 1.

[2] Kathleen C. Faller, ‘The Parental Alienation Syndrome: What is it and What Data Support It’ (1998) 3 Child Maltreatment 100, 100.

[3]Gardner ‘Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody Litigation’ (n 1) 1.

[4]Gardner ‘Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody Litigation’ (n 1) 1.

[5]Gardner ‘Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody Litigation’ (n 1) 1.

[6]Gardner ‘Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody Litigation’ (n 1) 1.

[7] Richard A. Gardner, ‘Parental Alienaion Syndrome v. Parental Alienation: Which Diagnosis Should Evaluators Use in Child-Custody Cases’ (2002) 30 The American Journal of Family Therapy 93, 96.

[8]Gardner ‘Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody Litigation’ (n 1) 2.

[9]Gardner ‘Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody Litigation’ (n 1) 2.

[10]Faller (n 2) 101.

[11]Gardner ‘Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody Litigation’ (n 1) 2.

[12]Gardner ‘Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody Litigation’ (n 1) 2.

[13]Gardner ‘Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody Litigation’ (n 1) 2.

[14]Gardner ‘Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody Litigation’ (n 1) 2.

[15] Gardner ‘Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody Litigation’ (n 1) 2-3.

[16]Gardner ‘Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody Litigation’ (n 1) 3.

[17]Gardner ‘Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody Litigation’ (n 1) 3.

[18] Richard A. Warshak, ‘Bringing Sense to Parental Alienation: A Look at the Disputes and the Evidence’ (2003) 37 Family Law Quarterly 273, 293.

[19]Gardner ‘Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody Litigation’ (n 1).

[20] Michele A. Adams, ‘Framing Contests in Child Custody Disputes: Parental Alienation Syndrome, Child Abuse, Gender, and Fathers' Rights’ (2006) 40 Family Law Quarterly 315, 325.

[21]Faller (n 2) 101.

[22]Faller (n 2) 101.

[23]Faller (n 2) 101.

[24]Faller (n 2) 101.

[25]Gardner ‘Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody Litigation’ (n 1) 1.

[26]Gardner ‘Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody Litigation’ (n 1) 3.

[27] Richard A. Gardner, Sexual Abuse Hysteria: Salem Witch Trials Revisited (Creative Therapeutics 1991) 9.

[28]ibid 12.

[29]Faller (n 2) 104.

[30]Faller (n 2) 104.

[31]Faller (n 2) 104.

[32]Faller (n 2) 106.

[33]Faller (n 2) 106.

[34]Faller (n 2) 106.

[35] Barbara E. Handschu, ‘Child Sex Abuse: Did it Really Happen?’ (1988) 10 Family Advocate 58, 58.

[36]Nancy Thoennes and Patricia G. Tjaden, ‘The Extent, Nature, and Validity of Sexual Abuse Allegations in Custody/Visitation Disputes’ (1990) 14 Child Abuse and Neglect 151, 160-61.

[37]Faller (n 2) 107.

[38]Faller (n 2) 107.

[39] Gardner, Sexual Abuse Hysteria: Salem Witch Trials Revisited (n 25) 9.

[40]Faller (n 2) 109.

[41]Faller (n 2) 110.

[42] Gardner, ‘Parental Alienaion Syndrome v. Parental Alienation: Which Diagnosis Should Evaluators Use in Child-Custody Cases’ (n 7) 105.

[43] Allison M. Nichols, ‘Towards a Child Centered Approach to Evaluating Claims of Alienation in High-Conflict Custody Disputes’ (2014) 112 Michigan Law Review 663, 667.

[44]Richard A. Gardner, ‘Differentiating Between Parental Alienation Syndrome and Bona Fide Abuse-Neglect’ (1999) 27 The American Journal of Family Therapy 97, 97.

[45]Nichols (n 41) 669.

[46]509 U.S. 579 (1993)

[47]Giannelli & Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence Evidence (4th ed. LexisNexis 2007) §§ 1.06.

[48]Nichols (n 41) 669.

[49]Nichols (n 41) 670.

[50]Nichols (n 41) 672.

[51]Nichols (n 41) 674.

[52]Nichols (n 41) 674.

[53]Faller (n 2) 107.

[54] Jennifer Hoult, ‘The Evidentiary Admissibility of Parental Alienation Syndrome: Science, Law, and Policy’ (2006) 26 Children’s Legal Rights Journal 1, 4.

[55]Malay Kumar Ganguly v Sukumar Mukherjee AIR 2010 SC 1162.

[56]Umamaheshwari D., ‘Medico-Legal Aspects in the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence’ (2014) 1 International Journal of Innovative Science, Engineering and Technology 1, 4.

[57]Sheila B. Das v P.R. Sugasree (2006) 3 SCC 62.

[58]Sheila B. Das (n 53) 69.

[59]Sheila B. Das (n 53) 69.

[60]Sheila B. Das (n 53) 69.

[61]Sheila B. Das (n 53) 73.

[62]J.E Artis, ‘Judging the Best Interests of the Child: Judges’ Account of the Tender Years Doctrine’ (2004) 38 Law & Society Review 769, 774.

[63]J. Selvan v N. Punidha (2007) 4 CTC 566.

[64]J. Selvan (n 58) 571.

[65]J. Selvan (n 58) 571.

[66]J. Selvan (n 58) 572.

[67]J. Selvan (n 58) 572.

[68]Vivek Singh v Romani Singh 2017 3 SCC 231.

[69]Vivek Singh (n 63) 246.

[70]Vivek Singh (n 63) 245.

[71]Vivek Singh (n 63) 244.

[72]Vivek Singh (n 63) 233.

[73]Vivek Singh (n 63) para. 32.

[74]Gaurav Nagpal v Sumedha Nagpal AIR 2009 SC 557.